

INTRODUCTION OF THE KATALOGEIS OF THE ATHENIAN CAVALRY¹

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The *locus classicus* for the procedure of enrolling recruits in the Athenian cavalry is found in Aristotle's *Athēnaiōn Politeia* (49.2):

τοὺς δ' ἰππέας καταλέγουσι μὲν οἱ καταλογεῖς, οὓς ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσῃ δέκα ἄνδρας· οὓς δ' ἂν καταλέξωσι παραδιδόασιν τοῖς ἱππάρχοις καὶ φυλάρχοις, οὗτοι δὲ παραλαβόντες εἰσφέρουσι τὸν κατάλογον εἰς τὴν βουλὴν, καὶ τὸν πίνακ' ἀνοίξαντες, ἐν ᾧ κατασεσημασμένα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἱππέων ἐστί, τοὺς μὲν ἐξομνυμένους τῶν πρότερον ἐγγεγραμμένων μὴ δυνατοὺς εἶναι τοῖς σώμασιν ἱππεύειν ἐξαλείφουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατειλεγμένους καλοῦσι, κἂν μὲν τις ἐξομώσῃται μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ σώματι ἱππεύειν ἢ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τοῦτον ἀφιάσιν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐξομνύμενον διαχειροτονοῦσιν οἱ βουλευταὶ πότερον ἐπιτῆδειός ἐστιν ἱππεύειν ἢ οὐ· κἂν μὲν χειροτονήσωσιν, ἐγγράφουσιν εἰς τὸν πίνακα, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τοῦτον ἀφιάσιν.
(OCT)

According to this account, the Athenian people elect ten *katalogeis* to enroll the cavalrymen. After they have composed the list (*katalogos*) of the new recruits, these “enrollers” give this list to the hipparchs and phylarchs, who in turn present the list to the Council of Five Hundred. The hipparchs and phylarchs open a tablet (*pinax*) on which are inscribed the names of the cavalrymen of the previous year and delete those who petition to be exempted because of bodily incapacity. The new recruits are then summoned, and those who swear that they have neither the financial means nor bodily capability are granted exemption from service. The councilors decide by vote whether any of the new recruits

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who does not request a discharge is fit to serve. Those qualified are inscribed on the *pinax* and the others are dismissed.

The task of enrolling and recruiting cavalrymen prior to the procedure just described appears to have been the province of the hipparchs and phylarchs. The evidence is sparse but consistent for the first half of the fourth century B.C. In his defense of the young aristocrat Mantitheos, Lysias has his client claim that he had been enrolled in the cavalry by the hipparch (or possibly phylarch) Orthoboulos, ὑπὸ Ὀρθοβούλου κατειλεγμένος ἱππεύειν (16.13), to whom he later petitioned to be struck from the *katalogos*, ἐξαλείψαι . . . ἐκ τοῦ καταλόγου (16.13), in order to join the hoplite ranks in 395 B.C.

In Xenophon's *de Equitum magistro* the author points to the cooperation between the hipparchs, phylarchs, and even the Council in the administration of the cavalry (1.8), but never once mentions the *katalogeis*. More to the point, in *Eq. Mag.* 1.9–12 Xenophon stresses the importance of the hipparch in the recruiting process:²

Τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν ἱππέας δῆλον ὅτι καθιστάναι δεῖ κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοὺς δυνατωτάτους καὶ χρήμασι καὶ σώμασιν ἢ εἰσάγοντα εἰς δικαστήριον ἢ πείθοντα. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι εἰς μὲν τὸ δικαστήριον τούτους εἰσακτέον εἶναι οὓς μὴ εἰσάγων διὰ κέρδος ἂν τις δοκοίη τοῦτο ποιεῖν· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἥττον δυναμένοις εὐθύς ἂν εἴη ἀποστροφή, εἰ μὴ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους πρώτους ἀναγκάζοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὓς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ τις νέους μὲν τὰ ἐν ἱππικῇ λαμπρὰ λέγων εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν καθιστάναι τοῦ ἱππεύειν, τοὺς δὲ κυρίους αὐτῶν ἥττον ἀντιτείνοντας ἔχειν, τάδε διδάσκων ὥς ἀναγκασθήσονται μὲν ἱπποτροφεῖν, ἣν μὴ ὑπὸ σοῦ, ὑπ' ἄλλου <γε> διὰ τὰ χρήματα· ἣν δ' ἐπὶ σοῦ ἀναβῶσιν, ὥς ἀποτρέψεις μὲν τοὺς παῖδας αὐτῶν τῶν πολυτελῶν τε καὶ μανικῶν ἱππωνίων, ἐπιμελήσῃ δὲ ὥς ἂν ταχὺ ἱππικοὶ γίγνουντο· λέγοντα δὲ οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖν ταῦτα πειρατέον. (OCT)

In this passage Xenophon advises the hipparch to recruit from among those most qualified by their wealth and physical condition.³ The

² See also *Eq. Mag.* 9.5: . . . ὅτι καὶ τοῖς καθίστησι τὸ ἱππικὸν ἐθέλουσι τελεῖν ἀργύριον ὥς μὴ ἱππεύειν . . . Ed. Delebecque, ed., *Xenophon, Le commandant de la cavalerie* (Paris 1973; Budé) 110, following a suggestion of E. Ekman, *Zu Xenophons Hipparchikos* (Uppsala 1933) 72–75, proposes that the implied subject of *καθίστησι* is the hipparch. For a discussion of the role of the hipparch in the recruiting process, see A. Martin, s.v. "Hipparchos," *Dar.-Sag.* (1899) 3.189.

³ Xenophon does not specify exactly how the hipparch is to make his initial selection of likely recruits—perhaps from available census records. That the Solonian census classes still existed, at least in name, at this time is confirmed by *Ath. Pol.* 7.4, 8.1, and 47.1. But the question of the minimum financial level to make one liable for cavalry service is problematic and lies outside the scope of this paper; for brief discussions, see G. Gilbert, *The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens* (Chicago 1968; repr. of New York ed.,

hipparch has two means to accomplish this—legal action or persuasion. He is urged to bring those men to court who are most likely to be suspected of having bribed him to pass over them. If the most powerful escape service, Xenophon remarks, then the less wealthy will have cause to avoid service, too. He advises the hipparch to persuade the young men to join by emphasizing the illustrious aspects of horsemanship and thereby fire them up with enthusiasm to serve. Persuasion is also to be applied to their parents. The hipparch should inform the parents that sooner or later they will be required to maintain a horse (*hippotrophein*) because of their wealth, if not by him, then by a hipparch in some other year. If their boys join during his hipparchy, he will stop their extravagant purchasing of expensive horses and quickly teach them to become horsemen.

There is no indication in *Ath. Pol.* 49.2 that the cavalry commanders had such independent authority or were so vulnerable to bribery or that such flexibility existed in the decision to join or not to join. The recruiting procedure described in *Ath. Pol.* 49.2 and that in *Eq. Mag.* 1.9–12 are not the same nor do they simply describe different phases of the recruiting process.⁴ I propose that the board of the *katalogeis* was introduced at sometime between the composition of the *de Equitum magistro* in the late 360s or early 350s and the composition of the *Athênaiôn Politeia* in the late 330s or 320s. More narrowly, I suggest that historical circumstances point to the decade prior to Chaeronea (338 B.C.).

The reasons that prompted the introduction of the *katalogeis* are to be found in the political and military exigencies of the 340s as well as in the long-term deleterious effects of the year of the Thirty Tyrants. As to the latter, I will argue that between 403 B.C. and the 350s many of the wealthy families, in part exhibiting a general abnegation of civic responsibility and in part reacting to a stigma historically attached to the cavalry during much of this period, contrived to avoid cavalry service.

The pivotal year was 404/3 B.C. when the Athenian cavalry supported the Thirty Tyrants, and after the withdrawal of the Thirty to Eleusis, the Ten.⁵ Judging from the fact that Thrasyboulos could only mount seventy horsemen in his revolt (X. *HG* 2.4.25), we may safely assume that the

1895) 321–22 and note 1, and A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* 2 (Oxford 1971) 33 and notes 3, 4.

⁴ As Martin (above, note 2) 189, note 8, correctly observed. Harrison (above, note 3) 33–34 seems to accept the fact that the recruiting procedures found at *Ath. Pol.* 49.2 and X. *Eq. Mag.* 1.9–12 are different, but cautions that the Aristotelian procedure might still not have eliminated the need to bring unwilling recruits to court. Sandys, however, in his commentary to *Ath. Pol.* 49.2 seems to believe that they are the same.

⁵ The cavalry became the enforcer of the new government of the Ten. Xenophon reports that the cavalrymen were quartered in the Odeion along with their mounts and their shields. At night they patrolled the walls as hoplites keeping an eye out for treachery and during the day they patrolled outside the walls as cavalrymen (*HG* 2.4.24).

support of the cavalry for the oligarchic regimes was nearly unanimous. Hostility towards the cavalry because of this partisan loyalty is attested at least a generation after 403 B.C.

In the Lysianic defense of Mantitheos, dated between 393 and 389 B.C., we learn that at his scrutiny for admission to the Council of Five Hundred, Mantitheos was charged with having served as a cavalryman under the Thirty. In the course of his defense Mantitheos refers to the fact that after the restoration of the democracy in 403, the phylarchs were ordered to determine who had actually served in the cavalry in order to force them to return their *katastaseis* (16.6). A *katastasis* was a loan granted by the state to a cavalry recruit "primarily to assist him in the purchase of his mount."⁶ The loan had to be repaid upon the trooper's retirement from the cavalry.⁷

This measure was apparently not designed to force the cavalrymen into an early retirement by the appropriation of the state-loans. Xenophon bears witness to the fact that some of the cavalrymen who had served under the tyrants were still serving in 400/399 B.C. Thibron, the Spartan commander appointed to lead an expedition against the Persian satrap in Anatolia in that year, requested that Athens contribute three hundred cavalrymen. Xenophon, who may himself have been a horseman in 404/3 B.C., comments parenthetically that Athens dispatched some of those who had served under the Thirty, thinking it to be a benefit to the democracy if these cavalrymen went abroad and died.⁸

Consider then the ramifications of the measure to force the return of the *katastaseis*. Although a cavalryman had to return the loan, he could not retire and would therefore have to provide a horse at his own expense or to buy another horse if he had sold his mount to defray some portion of the *katastasis*. If his new mount were injured or killed, the cavalryman would have to purchase a replacement with his own money, a significant double financial burden. Presumably, *katastaseis* were routinely granted to those recruited immediately after 403 B.C. We have no reason to assume otherwise.

There is good evidence that the grain allowance for the cavalry also came under fire in this period. Papyrus fragments of a Lysianic speech

⁶ J. Kroll, "An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry," *Hesperia* 46 (1977) 97–98. Our understanding of the financial arrangements of the cavalry *katastasis* has been greatly enhanced by Kroll's study of the cavalry tablets unearthed in the Athenian Agora in 1971 and by the study of K. Braun, "Der Dipylon-Brunnen B₁: Die Funde," *Ath. Mitt.* 85 (1970) 197–269, of cavalry tablets uncovered in the Ceramicus.

⁷ Harp. s.v. *κατάσρασις*, a gloss on Lys. 16.6–7.

⁸ *HG* 3.1.4. For brief comments, see C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979) 175.

against Theozotides,⁹ referring to events in 403/2 B.C.,¹⁰ record that the *misthophoria* for the Athenian cavalrymen was reduced from one drachma *per diem* to four obols.¹¹ This reduction must surely represent a financial reprisal against the cavalry for its disreputable actions in the previous year.¹²

The reputation of the cavalry in the decade following the year of the Thirty Tyrants was further diminished by the actions of individual citizens. One such case involved the son of the famous Alcibiades, also named Alcibiades, who refused to serve in the infantry on the expedition against the Spartans at the Haliartus River in Boeotia in 395 B.C. Although young Alcibiades apparently gained entrance to the cavalry as a mounted archer, he had not been legally enrolled in the cavalry for that year. In fact, Lysias informs us, Alcibiades had never been enrolled in the cavalry (14.10). In any event, this expedition was quite unusual in that some of the cavalrymen were expected to serve as hoplites even though they had always fulfilled their military obligations as cavalrymen. We know from remarks made by Mantitheos, who also participated in the campaign (see above), that it was generally felt that the cavalry was assured of safety, whereas the infantry anticipated real danger (16.13). I suggest that the Athenian democracy wanted to insure that the cavalry did not escape the dangers present for the rest of the citizenry.¹³ The fact that some of those men had probably served under the Thirty may have encouraged that decision.

⁹ First published by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Hibeh Papyrus* 1 (London 1906) 49–55; see Gernet, *Lys.* fr. 6, pp. 257–59 (Budé), and brief discussion by W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* 1 (Berkeley 1971) 21–23.

¹⁰ R. S. Stroud, "Greek Inscriptions, Theozotides, and the Athenian Orphans," *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 280–301.

¹¹ Kroll (above, note 6) 98, note 36, argues that the four obols represents the peace-time *sitos* allowance and that the one drachma rate continued as the war-time allowance at least to 351 B.C. (D. 4.28: one drachma). As for the 40 talents mentioned by Xenophon for the yearly cost of the cavalry (*Eq. Mag* 1.19), Kroll comments that "since 40 talents can also be divided into payments of 4 obols daily to a fully enrolled cavalry of 1000 and since 4 obols seems to have been the actual *sitos* stipend, Xenophon is apparently giving the conventional maximum figure that assumes a cavalry at ideal strength, whether the cavalry was at full strength at the time he was writing or not." But M. H. Hansen, "Perquisites for Magistrates in Fourth-Century Athens," *C&M* 32 (1980) 109, note 6, suggests that in X. *Vect.* 6.1, *ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν* (355 B.C.), *τὰ πάτρια* refers to a needed restoration of the former drachma *misthos* to cavalrymen and that this was apparently accomplished by the time of Demosthenes' remarks at 4.28—thus between 355 and 351 B.C.

¹² Gernet, *Lys.* fr. 6, pp. 234–36.

¹³ J. K. Anderson, *Ancient Greek Horsemanship* (Berkeley 1961) 134, however, implies that since Boeotia and Athens were allies at this time and the former possessed a redoubtable cavalry, there was a more pressing need for Athenian hoplites than for Athenian cavalrymen against a hoplite-preponderant Spartan army.

Lest it be thought that Alcibiades was an exceptional case, Mantitheos declared that during the campaign others had also illegally joined the cavalry ranks (16.13). One can assume that Alcibiades was not the only one prosecuted for deserting the hoplite ranks to join the cavalry; each publicized case must have contributed to the cavalry's loss of prestige. This whole business also points to a fair degree of laxity in the enrolling process.

The irregularity of service in the Haliartus campaign, coupled with the belief that cavalry service at this time offered little danger, reinforced the antipathy of the general populace towards the cavalry. For many of the younger cavalymen who had not seen service under the Thirty, this state of affairs must have been particularly disheartening.

This frustration may explain the monument of Dexileos who died in the campaign against the Spartans around Corinth in 394 B.C. A spectacular relief (now in the Ceramicus Museum) shows the young Dexileos mounted on a rearing horse heroically poised in the act of thrusting his javelin at a fallen enemy hoplite. Below the relief is an inscription (*IG II² 6217*) which translates:

Dexileos, son of Lysanias, of the deme Thorikos, was born in
the archonship of Teisander and died in the archonship of
Euboulides at Corinth, one of five horsemen.

It is noteworthy that this epitaph records the dates of the birth and death of the deceased, information unparalleled in Attic epitaphs.¹⁴ According to the archon dates, Dexileos was born in 414/13 and died in 394/3.¹⁵ Recently, C. Edmonson has plausibly explained this epitaph—that the parents of Dexileos wanted to announce publicly that their son, only twenty years old, had not only died bravely *for the democracy* in cavalry service, but was also too young to have participated in the cavalry and its disgrace in 404/3 B.C.¹⁶ The exact dating, therefore, stood as a testament to that fact.

This type of personal defense is paralleled in the Lysianic oration on the scrutiny of Evander. The accuser boasts that he had undergone the customary scrutiny for manhood after the year of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens (26.21). His tender age, then, allowed him to escape accusations of complicity with the oligarchs.

¹⁴ See Tod, *GHI* 2.105, p. 20.

¹⁵ For a brief discussion of his age, see P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) 172. For another epigraphical testimonium to Dexileos as a casualty in this year, see *IG II² 5222*. The ornate decoration and grandeur of this monument may reflect an attempt to rehabilitate the cavalry's reputation. I thank one of the anonymous referees for this suggestion.

¹⁶ Contained in a paper delivered at the APA/AIA meetings in Washington, D. C. in 1975, which he was kind enough to allow me to read in typescript in Athens in 1977.

Whatever good services some members of the Athenian cavalry may have performed during the Corinthian campaign, general Athenian hostility towards the cavalry did not cease. If it became known that a man seeking office had been a cavalryman in 404/3, he became vulnerable to attacks from his personal enemies or opportunistic rivals. I have already mentioned the attack on Manti-theos at his scrutiny for admission to the Council of Five Hundred. Similarly, in 382 B.C. at his scrutiny for the archonship, Evander was accused of having been a supporter of the oligarchs. His guilt was further heightened by association with the tyrants' most avid supporter, the cavalry. The client of Lysias claims that if a man's name was found to be inscribed on the cavalry lists for the year 404/3 his admission to the Council would be automatically rejected—even without an accuser (26.10). This claim is questionable,¹⁷ but the fact remains that at least as late as 382 B.C. membership in the cavalry under the Thirty could be paraded out for adverse effect.

I suggest that this continued hostility may have caused many former cavalrymen to withdraw from the political arena. When these men declined to participate in the political process and in the military process as officers, they also engendered in their sons—many of whom were maturing in the 380s and 370s—a disinterest in, or worse, a hostility towards, the service which had proved to be such a bane to their fathers. And bribery of the cavalry commanders must have proved a convenient way out of a disagreeable, expensive, and time-consuming duty. This development is subsumed within the general tendency among well-to-do Athenian citizens in the fourth century to want to avoid military, political, and liturgical obligations.¹⁸ For example, pseudo-Demosthenes describes young Phainippos as *hippotrophos agathos, plousios*, and *ischyros* (42.21), yet Phainippos secured his retirement from cavalry service after only a few years. How he accomplished this is not stated.

The difficulty of reaching the canonical one-thousand-man Athenian cavalry of the Classical Age is highlighted by Xenophon's own recommendations in *Eq. Mag.* 9.3–6. In this passage Xenophon suggests that the full complement of one thousand cavalrymen would be raised more quickly and with less burden to the citizens if Athens enrolled two hundred foreign horsemen, *εἰ διακοσίους ἱππέας ξένους καταστήσαιντο* (3).

¹⁷ D. M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca 1978) 75 and 168, accepts this claim that a cavalryman under the Thirty Tyrants could not gain admission to the Council. But see Lys. 16.8: *ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ταύτη γνῶμη χρωμένους, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν τότε ἱππευσάντων βουλευόντας, πολλοὺς δ' αὐτῶν στρατηγούς καὶ ἱππάρχους κεραιροποιημένους.*

¹⁸ See R. F. Wevers, *Isaeus. Chronology, Prosopography, and Social History* (Den Haag 1969) 121, wherein he observes from the orations of Isaeus that "the picture of society thus seen is one where the wealthy are trying to escape their financial and political responsibilities. . . ."

The two hundred were apparently to be included in the total quota of one thousand men. It is telling when Xenophon argues that the presence of these foreign horsemen would make the Athenian cavalry “more obedient” (εὐπειστότερον) and “more covetous of honor” (φιλοτιμότερον) in its display of bravery—something the Athenian cavalrymen appear to have lacked at this time. Xenophon recalls that the Lacedaemonian cavalry gained more respect when foreign cavalry was included (4). He then discusses the means by which the Athenian state can finance these foreign horsemen (5). He notes, among other things, that certain men already enrolled in the corps may have such strong objections to serving that they would be willing to buy their early retirement, *ὅτι καὶ † οἷς καθίστησι † τὸ ἵππικὸν ἐθέλουσι τελεῖν ἀργύριον ὥς μὴ ἵππεύειν*. . . . Xenophon suggests that even metics would welcome the chance to be enrolled, *εἰς ἵππικὸν καθισταμένους* (6), an idea he repeats in his *Vectigalia* (2.5).

So much for the underlying reasons for the enrollment problems of the cavalry by the mid-fourth century. But what was the immediate stimulus for the creation of the board of *katalogeis*? I suggest two possibilities, one internal, the other external.

(1) This step may have been prompted by certain irregularities connected with the hipparchy of Meidias *c.* 350 B.C.¹⁹ According to Demosthenes, during his term of office Meidias performed his cavalry duties in a rather casual fashion, serving when there seemed to be no danger, fleeing to the trireme he had offered to maintain for the state when danger presented itself (21.162–66). Meidias lambasted the cavalry upon his return to Athens (21.132, 197) and was in turn castigated by them (21.134). And Demosthenes accused Meidias of having introduced new laws which he later disowned,²⁰ one apparently involving a so-called

¹⁹ The date of Meidias' hipparchy is not without a fair measure of uncertainty, but I hold it to be associated with the Euboean campaign of 349/8 B.C. In this view I follow K. Fiehn, s.v. “Meidias,” *RE* 15,1 (1931) 335, and J. M. Carter, “Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus,” *Historia* 20 (1971) 422–23. For the view that Meidias was a *hippeus*, but not a hipparch, in 349/8 B.C., see A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 3 vols. (Leipzig 1885–87) 2.87–88; A. Martin, *Les cavaliers athéniens* (Paris 1886) 391–92; H. W. Parke, “Athens and Euboea 349–348 B.C.,” *JHS* 49 (1929) 248; J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971) 387 (by implication); and M. H. Hansen (above, note 11) 109, note 6 (by inference). Even if Meidias was not a hipparch in 349/8 (the scholia to D. 21.130 which call Cratinus, his fellow hipparch, *Κρατῖνον τὸν συνῖππαρχον*, Dindorf, 557,14, and later *ὁ Κρατῖνος*, *ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἵππαρχος ὦν*, 558,6, also cites Cratinus as *στρατηγὸς ἦν οὗτος τοῦ πεζοῦ*, 558,6), he must have been a hipparch around the time of the late 350s, judging by the immediacy with which Demosthenes refers to his term of office (see D. 21.166, 171, 173, 174).

²⁰ D. 21.173: *ἵππαρχος δὲ χειροτονηθεὶς λελύμανται τὸ ἵππικὸν ὑμῶν τοιοῦτους θεῖς νόμους οὓς πάλιν αὐτὸς ἔξαρκος ἦν μὴ τεθεικέναι*. The scholia to this passage report that these laws had been passed with the intention of abolishing the cavalry because they had disgraced the city: *οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπέλαβον τεθεῖσθαι νόμους ὥς οὐ δεῖται ἵππέων ἢ*

“two percent cavalry tax” (*hippikê pentêkostê*, 21.166) which LSJ s.v. *πεντηκοστός* reasonably suggests may have been intended as a substitute for actual cavalry service.²¹ Here Meidias may have contrived to implement Xenophon’s suggestion for cavalry exemption (viz., *Eq. Mag.* 9.5–6). Xenophon’s proposal had been intended as a means of instilling greater efficiency in the cavalry by removing half-hearted cavalrymen and by providing the funds to recruit experienced mercenaries. Not all Athenians were sold on this idea: back in 351 B.C. Demosthenes had railed against the intrusion of the mercenary element in Athens’ military affairs. After charging the Athenian hipparchs with occupying themselves with superfluous festival duties, the orator then informs us that the Athenian cavalry stationed at home was currently being commanded by a foreigner named Menelaus (τῶν δ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων ἀγωνιζομένων Μενέλαον ἱππαρχεῖν, 4.27). Perhaps Demosthenes himself led the way in demanding a re-examination of the whole recruiting process of the Athenian cavalry following the hipparchy of Meidias.

(2) There seems to have been increased concern about the deployment of (and strength of) Athens’ military forces in the late 350s and 340s because of the activities of Philip of Macedon in the northern Aegean, mainland Greece, and Euboea. In his *First Philippic* Demosthenes urged his fellow Athenians to prepare a fleet to counter the anticipated attacks from Philip. In addition to fifty triremes, the orator recommends the provisioning of horse transports in sufficient numbers to convey half of the Athenian cavalry (4.16). Demosthenes also urged the creation of a modest citizen-mercenary force to harass Philip on a regular basis. Included in this force were to be two hundred cavalrymen, at least fifty being Athenians, with the requisite *hippagōgoi* to transport them (4.21).

When Phocion and his troops (including Athenian cavalry: Plut. *Phoc.* 13.2–3) found themselves besieged at Tamynae on Euboea in 348 B.C., the Council of Five Hundred seriously considered sending the rest of the Athenian cavalry to relieve them (καὶ πάντας ἐξιέναι τοὺς ὑπολοίπους ἱππέας, D. 21.162). Towards the close of the Attic year 349/8, three hundred horsemen, some or all of whom had served on Euboea during that troubled year, were included in an unsuccessful relief expedition to

πόλιν. κατασχύνουσι γὰρ αὐτήν. These last words may refer to the undisciplined action of the Athenian cavalry at Tamynae (Plut. *Phoc.* 13.2–3). The scholia at 173 speculate on the real motives of Meidias in this attack on the cavalry: ὥσως δ’ ἐποίησεν, ἵνα μὴ στρατεύηται.

²¹ The Demosthenic passage reads: οὐδένα γὰρ τρόπον ἄλλον ἐν τοῖς ἱππέσιν αὐτὸν στρατείας ἀτελῆ ποιῆσαι δυνάμενος, ταύτην εὗρηκε Μειδίας καινὴν ἱππικὴν τινα πεντηκοστήν. Both W. W. Goodwin, in his commentary on Demosthenes *Against Meidias* (New York 1969; repr. of Cambridge ed., 1906) 96, and J. H. Vince in the Loeb edition (*Demosthenes* III, p. 115) translate (and interpret) *hippikê pentêkostê* as “cavalry-collectorship.” Goodwin explains that Meidias, according to Demosthenes, sought to get “a collector’s profits by pretending to serve in the cavalry.” Unfortunately, we do not know the legality of, the duration of, or the exact nature of this so-called “cavalry-collectorship.”

Olynthus.²² The transporting by ships of a third of the Athenian cavalry to such a distant theatre of war was a notable event in the fourth century. Even during the Peloponnesian War Athens had transported no larger Athenian cavalry force than this (see, e.g., Th. 2.56.2, 5.2.2). As war with Philip approached, and in consideration of his strength in cavalry, Athens must have been justifiably concerned about the strength of its own cavalry.²³

In conclusion, contrary to Martin's belief that the whole procedure described by Aristotle represented "un relâchement considerable dans les opérations du recrutement de la cavalerie athénienne,"²⁴ I propose that by the 340s the Athenian state felt compelled to reform the recruiting procedure of the cavalry, introducing the board of the *katalogeis* attested for the first and only time at *Ath. Pol.* 49.2.²⁵ At this time of military exigency and perhaps stinging from the effects of Meidias' hipparchy, the Athenian democracy created this board to eliminate bribery and to achieve greater success in compelling its wealthier citizens to resume their traditional responsibility of cavalry service. The *katalogeis* probably initially examined the financial status of each of the potential recruits and then selected those liable for service. The hipparchs (and phylarchs) were probably still expected to prosecute recalcitrant recruits in the courts, but now they acted as agents for the *katalogeis* and the Council of Five Hundred, not as independent recruiters of first instance.

²² Jacoby, *FGrH* 328 Philochoros F 51, and D. 21.197. On this expedition, see J. M. Carter (above, note 19) 418–29. On Chares, commander of this expedition, see W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War 2* (Berkeley 1974) 77–85. For discussion of Euboean affairs in the 340s, see J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 98, 153, 162–66, and 169–70.

²³ It is also possible, as one referee suggests, that the introduction of the *katalogeis* parallels the reorganization of the hoplite ephebeia after Chaeronea in 338. Since the reorganization of the hoplite ephebeia was intended to ensure a better trained citizen army (see F. Mitchel, "Lykourgan Athens," *Seiple Lectures II* [Cincinnati 1973] 199), it may perhaps be that the cavalry reform was also viewed as necessary or at least appropriate at this time. Nevertheless, I still believe that the cavalry reform was given forceful immediacy by the growing concerns over Philip's territorial expansionism in the 340s.

²⁴ Martin, s.v. "Hipparchos," *Dar.-Sag.* (1899) 3.189.

²⁵ The office of "Hipparch to Lemnos" mentioned at *Ath. Pol.* 61.6 may have been introduced in conjunction with this cavalry reform, but the issue is very complex and warrants a separate treatment.